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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases but by little decisions which the commnon run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution, or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound
interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."-fr. Justice Holmes, Collected

Legal Essays; p 269.

NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
DIVORCE-JURISDICTION TO GRANT DIVORCE WHERE CAUSE
AROSE WHILE PARTIES WERE DOMICILED IN ANOTHER
STATE. Hays v. Hays.'
Plaintiff, a domiciled citizen of Missouri, brought an action for divorce,
alleging as grounds therefor indignities. It appeared that defendant was never
at any time domiciled in Missouri, and that plaintiff was not domiciled within
the state at the time of the occurrence of the alleged indignities. Plaintiff had,
however, aciuired a domicil within the state, as required by the Missouri
statute,2 before she brought her action. Defendant appeared in the action, and
claimed that the Court did not have proper jurisdiction to grant the divorce,
because the grounds alleged therefor had happened before plaintiff had become
a citizen or resident of Missouri. The trial Court sustained defendant's plea,
the action was dismissed, and this judgment was affirmed by the Kansas City
Court of Appeals. The latter Court, without referring in any way to the divorce statutes, stated "that a court has no jurisdiction over a divorce suit or
.the marital status, where the cause for divorce arose while the parties were
domiciled in another state, or while the plaintiff was not a resident of the state
in which the suit was brought .... "3
The Court of Appeals seemed to be of the opinion that, under such a state
of facts, a court inherently lacked jurisdiction, and had no power to grant relief. The notion seemed to prevail that, from an international point of view,
jurisdiction to grant a divorce depends not only upon theforum's being the
plaintiff's domiciliary court, but also upon the additional fact that the plaintiff
1.
2.

(1927) 291 S. W. 508.
Section 1804, R. S. 1919.

3. 291 S. W. L c.

SOS.
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was domiciled within the forum when the cause for the divorce prayed for ococcurred. The case stands for the proposition that even though a plaintiff's
domiciliary court has full jurisdiction over a defendant spouse,' it may not
grant a valid decree unless, also, the plaintiff had a domicil within that court's
jurisdiction at the time that the defendant violated his or her marital duties,
and thereby furnished grounds for the action.
The decision does not turn merely upon the question of whether or not the
Missouri statutes authorize a divorce upon the facts stated. The opinion does
not purport to construe the statutes; quite the contrary, it seems to embody a
positive rule of law to the effect that if a plaintiff's domicil has a statute authorizing or requiring its courts to grant a divorce where the cause therefor arose
before the plaintiff acquired a domicil in such state, or while the parties were
domiciled elsewhere, such legislation is invalid, and to be regarded as an unwarrantable attempt to regulate matters not within the legitimate control of
such a domiciliary sovereign. Is it true that statutes of such a nature are an
abuse of governmental power and, therefore, invalid?
It has generally been held that "every state or sovereignty has the right
to determine the domestic relations of all persons having their domicil within
its territory."r, Such jurisdiction has usually been considered essential to
proper regulation of domestic affairs. Governments must have power to control the marriages of their own citizens, because it is necessary for the preservation and development of the state. There would seem to be nothing underlying
this theory of the right of a domiciliary sovereign to control the marriage relation of its citizens other than the fact that such a government has a vital
interest in the domestic relations of the latter. Once the relation of sovereign
and citizen is established, the sovereign has power to control and regulate the
citizen's marriage in any proper manner. For these reasons, there is a considerable amount of authority holding that a sovereign may grant a divorce to its
domiciled citizens for any cause whatever, and even though such cause may
have occurred before a citizen gained his or her domicil within the state. The
position taken is that, by the very act of acquiring a domicil within a state,
the marriage becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the law of the domicil, and
the status is necessarily controlled thereby.6 Such a ruling seems to be sound,
and quite in accord with the generally prevailing conception of the nature of
jurisdiction to divorce. It hardly seems necessary to add that the decision in
the case under review involves a repudiation of these more or less fundamental
propositions.
4. The case was before the Kansas City
Court of Appeals twice. Upon the prior hearing,
the Court held that the trial Court had duly obtained jurisdiction of the defendant. See 282 S. W.
57. 58.
5. Gould v. Crow (1874) 57 Mo. 200, 204.
The proposition is elementary. See, also, Haddock
v. Haddock (1905) 201 U. S. 562,569.26 Sup. Ct.
525., 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1; Ditson v. Ditson (1856) 4 R.I. 87. In the Haddock case, supra,
the federal Supreme Court speaks of inherent
jurisdiction that a state must possess over the
marriage relations of its domiciled citizens, 201
U. S. 1. c. 569. The question of jurisdiction to
divorce must not be confused with the problem
of when a court, possessing the power to divorce,
has acquired jurisdiction of the defendant in a
pending action. As already observed herein, that

question was not present in the instant case, because the trial Court had full jurisdiction over the
defendant's person. See jupra note 4.
6. Thompson v. State (18S6) 28 Ala. 12;
Tolen v. Tolen (1831) 2 Black. (Ind.) 407,21 Am.
Dec. 742; Colburn v. Colburn (1888) 70 Mich.
647; Rose v. Rose (1916) 132 Minn. 340, 156 N.
W. 664; Shreck v. Schreck (1870) 32 Tex. $78,
S Am. Rep. 251; Cheever v. Wilson (1869) 9 Wall.
(U. S.)108, 19 L. Ed. 604 (dictum). See, also,
Jones v. Jones (1889) 67 Miss. 19S. "In this rase
the complainant, as he testifies, thought of making his home in the West and one of the reasons
for selecting Michigan was because of her divorce
laws. We think he had a right to leave New York
because he was not satisfied with the laws of that
state in reference to divorce or any other matter,
and had a right to settle in Michigan because the
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Moreover, it is believed that any other holding, than that advocated in
the preceding paragraph, may well work an injustice upon an innocent husband or wife, and that the decision in the principal case, if it becomes the law
of Missouri, may turn out to be a case of embarrassment to the courts. To
illustrate, let it be supposed that H. and W.,husband and wife, are living together domiciled in state 1; that, while the parties are so living, H commits
adultery; that thereafter the parties remove to state 2, and establish a domicdil
there; that after such removal to 2, W. for the first time learns of H's misconduct in 1; will W. be able to obtain a divorce in 2 in the absence of condonation? If the case under review is to be followed, obviously, W will be unable
to bring an action in 2, because the cause for divorce occurred while the parties
were domiciled in another state. Yet, to deny W relief in 2's courts seems
unjust, and may work a real hardship upon an innocent party. Indeed, it may
well be asked, if W's action will not lie in 2, where may she procure a divorce?
It seems open to grave question whether W. may return to 1 and bring her
action there, because the proposition usually is that domiciliary courts have
exclusive jurisdiction to divorce. 7 It might very properly be said, in the assumed case, that after W's removal from 1, I's courts ceased to havejurisdiction over her marriage relation, the same being submitted to the jurisdiction of
2 and its courts, as a result of her establishing a domicil in that state. The
courts of 1, if W brought an action for divorce there, might very well take
the position that they were no longer concerned with W's marriage, because
of her new domiciliary allegiance, and hold that it was for 2, and its courts, to
determine whether the marriage should be dissolved or not. Of course, if 1's
courts did dispose of W's action in this way, and the rule of law laid down in
the principal case prevailed in 2, W's plight would be most unfortunate, and
there would be no way for her to free herself from H, although his conduct had
afforded an almost universally recognized ground for absolute divorce. It is
urged that in cases of the kind last assumed that it is almost essential to clothe
a domicilary court with full power to divorce its citizens no matter when the
cause for divorce may have occurred; that in any event itis highly desirable so
to do, and that in the assumed case, even though W might have returned to 1,
and have been able to have gotten a divorce there, compelling her to follow
this line of action would have served no useful purpose, but would merely have
imposed an unnecessary hardship upon her.
Section 1804 of the Revised Statutes, 1919, provides that "no person shall
be entitled to a divorce ....who has not resided within the state one whole
laws in this state suited him in relation to divorce
or any other thing. Colburn v. Colburn, supra,
70 Mich L c. 649 a seq.
In Stone v. Stone (1908) 134 Mfo. App. 242,
113 S. W. 1157. the Saint Louis Court of Appeals
had the same question presented to it as was
presented in the case under review. That court
held that there was jurisdiction to grant a divorce.
In commenting upon sec. 2924R. S. 1899. which is
identical with sec. 1804 R. S,1919,it was said that
"itis essential to conferjurisdiction, thatthepetition allege either that the plaintiff has resided
in this State one whole year .....or that the
injury complained of was committed within this
State .... The petition alleged that plaintiff had
resided in the State one whole year next before
the filing of the petition and therefore, as to

jurisdiction, brought the case within the first
clause of section 2924. .•. " See, also, Cheatham
v. Cheatham (1847) 10 Mo. 188; Coulter v.
Coulter (1907) 124 Mo. App 149, 100 S. W. 1134;
Johnson v. Johnson (1902) 95 Mo. App. 329, 68
S. W. 971, where it is assumed, without discussion,
that there is jurisdiction to divorce regardless of
where the grounds therefor occurred if only the
plaintiff had a domicil in the state at the time
that the action is brought. But there is authority
elsewhere contra. See, Nii.holas v. Maddox (1900)
52 La. Ann. 1492, 27 So. 966; Clark v. Clark
(1835) 8 N. H. 21; Prosser v. Warner (1875) 47
Vt. 667, 19 Am. Rep. 132.
7. See, Clark v. Clark, jupta, note 6, 8 N.
IL 21, where this possible difficulty was suggested,
but no solution therefor offered.
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year next before filing of the petition, unless the offense or injury complained
of was committed within this state, or whilst one or both of the parties resided
within.the state." Perhaps the statute is not as clearly worded as is desirable.
It is always unfortunate when a statutory purpose is found only as a result of
implication, and not because it is explicitly stated. But it seems clear enough
that the Legislature intended Missouri courts to grant divorces in cases where
(1) the offense occurred within this state or whilst one or both of the parties
resided within the state without requiring any protracted period of domicil upon
the part of the plaintiff, and (2) in other cases where the offense complained of
occurred outside of the state, when neither of the parties were domiciled within the state at sudh time, but in this last case the plaintiff may not sue unless
he or she has resided within the state during the year immediately preceding
the bringing of the action. 8 It would seem then that under this statute the action
in the principal case should have been entertained because the court not only
had jurisdiction from an international point of view, but also because the
statute clearly intends and provides for the exercise of jurisdiction under the
existing facts.
The learned Court in the case under review cited Stokes v.Stokeis as authority
for the proposition that the trial Court had no jurisdiction. In that case the
parties were domiciled together, as husband and wife, in England until 1807,
at which time they separated by agreement. Some nine years thereafter, the
wife having acquired a domicil in Missouri, brought an action for divorce here,
alleging as grounds therefor her husband's adultery, committed in England,
after the parties' separation in 1807. The Supreme Court denied the divorce,
Pettibone, J., saying that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief because "the
laws of England offered her redress" and "if, for nine years, she could behold
without complaining the open adultery and profligacy of her husband," he saw
"no reason why the courts of this country, should, at this late hour, be called
upon to interfere in her behalf.. ." Thelearned judge considered "the adultery
in England as waived by the conduct of the complainant" and was unwilling
"to establish the principle that parties may lie in their own country, under injuries of this kind, for years, and then come here and ask us for the redress which
they might and ought to, have obtained there."1 0
To the writer, it seems that the Stokes case does not involve in any sense
the question when a court has jurisdiction to divorce. It deals merely with the
question of a plaintiff's laches, and holds that a delay of nine years is fatal to
an action of divorce, at least if the plaintiff acquires a new domicil in the interin
and had ample opportunity to sue at his or her old domicil before gaining the
new one."' It is submitted that the Stokes case is not authority for the rule of

8. In Cheatham v. Cheatham, supra, note
6, the court said that the plaintiff's petition would
bedefectiveunlessitallegedthat"thecomplainant
had resided within the State one whole year next
before the filing of the petition" or "that the offense complained of was committed within the
State .... 10 Mo. 1. c. 299. See also, Stone v.
Stone, rupra, note 6, 134 Mo. App. 242, 113 S.W.
1157.
9. (1823) 1 Mo. S20.
10. 1 Mo. i. c. 321 a eq. The statute in

force at the time this action was brought provided
that "No person shall be entitled to a divorce
from the bonds of matrimony ....who has not
resided within this territory one whole year
previous to the filing his or her petition or libel."
Laws of 1818, p. 171. There is nothing in the
statutory provisions in force at that time limiting
the court's jurisdiction to divorce for the causes
enumerated other than this provision.
11. The court in Stokes v. Stokes cited as
authority for its decision Williamson v. William-
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law laid down in the principal case; that the Kansas City Court ofAppeals was
free under the Missouri decisions to'have allowed the divorce, and by denying
"the plaintiff relief it disregarded well established principles concerning jurisdiction to divorce, and the plain dictates of the Missouri Statutes. It is to be
hoped that this error may be remedied, and that the decision may not finally
settle the question in this undesirable way.
J. L. P.
CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS..VESTED AND CONTINGENT REMAINDERS. Donaldson v. Donaldson.'
Real property was gran ted by deed as follows: "to the sole and exclusive use
of the second party till his death; at the death of the secondparty the above decribed real estate shall vest in fee in"his children, and if he have not children
alive at his death one-third to his wife and the remainder back to his parents."
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the limitations over upon the death
of the second party (i. e. the life tenant) were alternativecontingent remainders.
The decision raises the perplexing and interesting question as to when a limitation after a life estate should be construed as a contingent remainder rather
than as one that is vested.
The books abound with statements to the effect that remainders should be
held to be vested whenever this can be done consistently with the language
used in the instrument creating the estate. 2 Such a construction is desirable
because, (1) vested remainders are unaffected by the Rule against Perpetuities,
and (2) because, a contingent remainder-contrary to the intention of the
creator of the same-can be destroyed as the result of a merger, while a vested
remainder may never be affected in this way.
Suppose that property is conveyed to A for life followed by a contingent
remainder to B for life, which, in turn, is followed by a vested remainder to C

and his heirs; under such a state of facts, if C acquired A'slife estate, while B's
remainder was still contingent, C would have the entire fee, the particular
estate supporting B's remainder would be gone, and B'scontingentremainder
would be lost. According to common-law principles, and, in the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary, B could never take, even though the

son (1815) S Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 488, an opinion
by Chancellor Kent. In that case the action was
brought by the husband, a domiciled citizen of
New York, for the wife's adultery. The husband
was domiciled in New York, when the offense
was committed. The holding was that plaintiff
could not succeed because "to sustain a bill of
divorce for adultery, after the husband (as in this
case) has acquiesced under a knowlege of it,
for
twenty years, would be repugnant to the institutions of all mankind." The question of jurisdiction to grant a divorce where the cause arose outside of the state and before the plaintiff acquired
a domicil within the state was not present in
the Williamson case, and was not considered.
The court in the Stokes case, supra, (1 Mo.
I. c. 323) stated that "adultery is a good cause

fordivorce ....
if committed within the State. or
while the injured partyis domiciled within this
State." This portion of the opinion, taken alone,
would seem to involve the proposition that if
a defendant committed adultery without the state
and while the plaintiff was not a domiciled citizen
of the state that a divorce could not be granted
for such adultery. It is believed that this statement of the Court was not necessary to the decision, and is to be regarded merely as drlum.
1. (1925) 311 Mo. 208, 278 S. W. 686.
2. Kale;, Estates, (2nd Ed.) se 329 a xti;
Tiedeman, Real Property, (2nd Ed.) see. 401;
Washburn, Real Property, (6th Ed.) se. 1537
a erg; Chew v. Keller, (1889) 100 Mo. 1 . 368,
13 S.W. 395; Tindal v. Tindal, (1901) 167 Mo.
I.e.225, 66 S. W. 1092.
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very contingency to his taking might later occur, and he might survive A.3
The proposition is that a contingent remainder must vest at or before the
termination of the particular estate that supports it. In the assumed case A's
particular estate disappeared when C acquired the same. The same result would
also be reached in the supposititious case for the same reason, if A had acquired C's remainder. The tenant of a particular estate may, at common law,
destroy the contingent remainder by surrendering his estate to the owner of
the next vested estate in remainder, at least as great in quantum as the surrendered estate, or by acquiring by purchase the next vested estate of inheritance, the particular estate supporting the contingent remainder in each
instance beihg thereby merged," and destroyed. 4
Again, assume that property is limited by way of devise to A for life, with
a remainder to A's children, with a further remainder to B in default of such
children, and let it be further assumed that A is the testator's heir at law, or
residuary devisee. In such a case, A has a life estate, and until the birth of a
child to A, there are outstanding alternative contingent remainders, the reversion in fee in the meantime remaining in A awaiting the vesting of the remainder either in a child of A or in B as the case may be. So long as A made no
disposition of his interests, the contingent remainders would be unaffected.
The common law did not defeat the testator's intention by saying that A's
life estate merged with his fee in reversion.6 But if A conveyed his interests to
a stranger, X for example, a merger would occur, and neither contingent remainder could take effect. The particular estate (i. e. A's life estate) which
supported the remainders was gon'e upon the conveyance to X; consequently
a child subsequently born to A could not take; or if A died without ever having
6
had a child, B could not take.
At common law property could not be vested by grant subject to divestment in favor of another upon the happening of any specified contingency.
For example, if property were limited to A and his heirs, but if A shall die
without leaving a child surviving him, then to B and his heirs, the limitation
to B and his heirs could not take effect. A fee could not be limited upon a fee.7
This being so, if the limitations in the principal case are to be governed by common-law rules of conveyancing, the estates created after A's life estate could
only take effect as alternative contingent remainders. Suppose that A had a
child; if the estate given such child were to be held to vest in him on birth, and
such child were thereafter to predecease A, the fee would at such time have to
shift, one third to A's widow,and two thirds to A's parents. Such a shifting
was not permissible. Therefore, the only possible way that these limitations
could be effective at common law would be to hold that A. took a life estate,
and that the further future estates would be alternative contingent remainders

3. Tiedeman, Real Property, (2nd Ed.) sec.
421; Washburn, Real Property, (6th Ed.) sec.

both A and B convey to X. See Bennett v. Morris
(1834) 5 Rawle (Pa.) 9; Bond v. Moore (1908)

1597.

236 Ill.
576, 86 N. E. 386, 19 L. R.A. (N. S.) S40.

4. Tiffany, Real Property, (2nd Ed.) sec. 506
el req.
5. Hobbs v. Yeager, (Mo.) (1924) 263 S.W.
225.
6. Also, if there is a conveyance to A for life,
then a contingent remainder to B, then a vested
remainder to C, B's contingent remainder will be
destroyed by a merger in a stranger, as where

Likewise a contingent remainder may be destroy.
ed by a conveyance of the reversion to the life
tenant, andalsobythelifetenantconveyingtothe
reversioner. See Barr v. Gardner (1913) 259 Ill.
256. 102 N. E. 287.
7. Luddington v. Kime (1695) 1 Salk. 224, 1
Ld. Raym. 203,3 Lev. 542."
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taking effect for thefirst time at A's death in favor of A's children, if any were
then living, otherwise going to A's wife'and parents.$
Section 2271 R. S. 1919 provides in part that "an estate of freehold or of
inheritance may be made to commence infuturo by deed in like manner as by
will." Prior to this statute it had always been possible to create shifting interests by will; property could first be devised to A and his heirs with a provision that it should thereafter, upon the happening of a specified contingency,
shift to B and his heirs. 9
In O'Day v. MeadowsloourSupreme Court stated that this statutory provision changed the common lawrule as to conveyances inter vivos, and, while there is
no express ruling upon this specific question, it would seem to be entirely pos.sible, with the aid of this statute, to create a shifting interest by deed, just
as it was possible to do so before the statute's enactment by will.
Section 2174 R. S.1919 is to the effect that "Conveyances of lands, or of
any estate or interest therein, may be made by deed executed by any person
having authority to convey the same .... without any other act or ceremony
whatever." It would seem that this statute would also make it possible to
create shifting interests by deed, and while again there is no positive decision
so holding in this state our Supreme Court has stated generally that this statute
has done away with the technical requirements of the common law rules.u
Assuming, then, that it is possible to create shifting interests in Missouri
by deed, and bearing in mind that all estates should be held to be vested whenever possible, should the limitations in the case u'nder review have been construed as alternative contingent remainders, or should it have been held that
A's children, as soon as born, took vested remainders in fee subject to being
divested in favor of A's widow and parents in the event of A's children dying
before A? A remainder is vested which "stands ready to take effect in possession whenever and however the preceding particular estate of freehold determines."13 If all that a remainderman has to do to enjoy the property in
possession is to await the termination of the particular estate supporting his
remainder, he has a vested interest, and the mere fact that hemust, to enjoy
the property in possession, survive the life tenant does not render his remainder
contingent.14
On the other hand, if by the language used in creating the estate a "conditional element is incorporated into the description of, or into the gift to the
remainder-man, then the'remainder is contingent; but if, after words giving
8. Tiedeman, Real Property, (2nd Ed.) sec.
415; Washburn, Real Property, (6th Ed.) Sec.
1575; Luddington v. Rine, supra, note 7.
9. Tiedeman, Real Property, (2nd Ed.) Sec.
537; Washburn, Real Property, (6th Ed.) Secs.
1737-1739.
10. (1905) 194 Mo. 588,92S. W.637,112 Am.
St. Rep. 542.
11. The writer submits that there is no distinction between shifting and springing interests
so as to cause a different rule to be applied in construing these interests under the Missouri law
above referred to. Both of these interests take
effect by a changing of the seisin. If a springing
interest may be created by deed there would seem
to be no good reason for not allowing a shifting
interest to be created in a like manner. For a
discussion of this point, see an article by Profes-

ror Hudson in University of Missouri Bulletin,
11 Law Series 3.
12. O'Day v. Meadows (1905) 194 Mo. L c.
623-625, the Court, quoting from Abbot v. Holway
(1881), 72 Me. 298, said, "In other words the
mere technicalities of the ancient law are dispensed with upon compliance with statute requirements." See, also, Buzton v. Kroeger. (1908)
219 Mo. L c. 256, 117 S. W. 1147: Eckle v. Ryland
(1913). 26 Mo. L c.4S4, 165 S. IV. 1035. luregard to statutory changes in conveyances in
general, see 3 Pomeroy. Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.) 214 n.:
Parks. Declaration of Trusts and the Statute of
Uses, Univ. of Mo. BuL 27 Law Series 18, a.
13. Kale; Estates (2nd Ed.) s. 308.
14. Webb v. Hearing, (1617) Cro. Jor. 41S,
Kales, op. dt. see. 308 t stq. See, also, Varne v.
Sorge (1914) 258 Mfo. 162. 171, 167 S. W. 967.
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a vested interest, a clause is added divesting it, the remainder is vested. Thus,
on a devise to A for life, remainder to his children, but if any child dies in
the lifetime of A his share to go to those who survive, the share of each child
is vested, subject to be divested by its death. But on a devise to A for life,
remainder to such of his children as survive him, the remainder is contingent."'1
Whenever it is possible to find a present gift to persons fulfilling the description
of the remainderman contained in the instrument creating the estates, the
remainder will be considered vested even though it may be divested at a later
date by the happening of some condition, which will prevent the remainderman
taking and enjoying the property. On the other hand, if the instrument, which
creates the remainder, requires the remainderman to qualify as such by fulfilling certain conditions, the remainder can never be construed as vested until
such qualifications have been met... .16
In the principal case the deed provided that upon the death of the life
tenant the property should vest in fee in his children and if no children should
be alive at his death, it should go over. Here there is first given a vested remainder; to enjoy in possession the children have merely to await the termination of their father's particular estate, the subsequent direction, that the property should go over in the event of the children not surviving their parent,
should not convert it into a contingent remainder and it should be regarded as
being vested subject to be divested in favor of the ultimate takers if the children did not survive. It is believed that the decision could have been to this
effect without violating any fundamental rule of conveyancing, and that such
would have been the more desirable decision for the reasons heretofore given.
Every interest should be construed as a vested interest, if this can be done.
The Supreme Court in the principal caserelied upon the cases of Dickerson
v. Dickerson,17 Buxton v. Kroeger18 and Eckle v. Rylandg as authority. In the

Dickerson case the wording used was: "and at her death the said farm to be
divided between the .... surviving children and grandchildren if any whose
parents are dead .... ,1 - It was rightly held in that case that the remainder to

the children and grandchildren was contingent because the contingency was
incorporated into the very description of the remaindermen; it was to the
children and grandchildren surviving; to qualify as remaindermen, the children and grandchildren had to be surviving at the termination of the receding
particular estate. In the principal case there was no such requirement as this.
The property was limited to the children at the death of the life tenant with a
provision for divestment in the event of any child's death before that of the
life tenant. In the Buxton case the limitation was to "children then living."19b
The decision there was that the children's estate was contingent and rightly so
15. Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, (3rd Ed.)
sec. 108.
16. Gray, op. cit. sec. 85 et req. One of the
earlier cases on this point was Doe v. Scudamore,
(1800) 2 B & P. 289. In that case the devise was
to B for life, then to A in case she survive B,
but not otherwise. The court held the remainder
to A was contingent because A had to be living
at the time B's estate terminated in order to take.
In the case of De Lassus v. Gatewood (1880)
71 Mo. 371, there was a devise to A for life, and
at her death or remarriage to her children that
were alive or their bodily heirs. The court held
the remainder to the children was contingent;

for the children would have to be living at the
death or remarriage of their mother.
See, also, McWilliams v. Ramsey (1853) 23
Ala. 813; Chapin v.Crow (1893) 147111.219,35 N.
E. 536, 37 Am. St. Rep. 213; Smith v. Rice
(1881) 130 Mass. 441; Buxton v. Kroeger (1908)
219 Mo. 224, 117 S. W. 1147.
17. (1907) 211 Mo. 483, 110 S. W. 700.
18. (1909) 219 Mo. 224, 117 S. W. 1147.
19. (1914) 256 Mo 424, 165 S. W. 1035.
19a. (1908) 211 Mo. 1. c. 486, 110 S. W. 700.
19b. (1909) 219 Mo. 1.c. 242-243, 117 S. W.
1147.
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because again the contingency was incorporated into the description oftheparties who were to take.

In Eckle v. Ryland the deed created a trust and provided that on the death
of certain beneficiaries the trust should cease and the property should "go to

and vest in" L and F "or to their heirs should they or either of them be dead."n
The Court held that L had a contingent remainder, and that L took nothing
under the deed unless he survived the prior beneficiaries. This decision would

seem to be authority for the holding in the principal case, but seems unfortunate and to violate fundamental and well established rules of construction.
In Warne v. Sorge,21 decided some six months after the Eckle case, thelimitation was "to the child or children he mayleave surviving him and, in default,"-"
over this remainder was held to be vested. Of course the limitation in the
Varne case is not similar in its wording to that in the case under review, but
the Court in the course of its opinion said that "when the language of an instrument creates a doubt as to whether it was the intention of the grantor to
convey a contingent or a vested remainder, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the creation of a vested remainder."" It would seem that this rule of

construction was overlooked in the Eckle as well as in the principal case,
which is regrettable.
L. M. E.
POWER OF FEDERAL JUDGE TO COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE.
Barham v. U. 3.1
The defendant was convicted pf feloniously possessing intoxicating liquor
in Indian country. He assigns for error certain comments of the trial judge
upon the evidence. "The language objected to is that in which the court
stated that he drew certain inferences, and expressed the opinion that certain
material facts were true, although, as the court says, 'there is no evidence of
that.' It is then stated that the court not only did not believe the testmony of
a deputy sheriff produced as a witness for the defense, but added that he had no
respect and no regard for him, 'and my judgment is, as long as men like him
wear a deputy sheriff's commission, why fifteen year old girls will be at dances
drinking liquor. That is my opinion of his evidence. I don't give it any credence, have no respect for it, but that is only my idea of how his evidence appeals to me. You may look at it entirely different, and that is your business,
and your responsibility."' The court said that they had discussed the same
question in Cook v. U. S.2 decided the same day, andfollowingit, they reversed
the judgment without repeating their reasons, Judge Stone dissenting. In
Cook v. U. S., supra, the same judges held the comment improper because the
court repeated several times that he gave no credence to Cook's testimony.
The Court there said, "these statements ........... partake of the nature
of a partisan argument, very apt to convince the jury, by mere weight of reiteration, of the falsity of that part of the defendant's case .........
The judge's comment in the case under review was improper for thereason
given that his repeated emphasis of the falsity of the deputy's testimony was
20. (1914) 256 Mo. 1. c. 433-435, 165 S. W.
1035
21. (1914) 2S8 Mo. 162, 167 S.W. 967.
22. (1914) 258 Mo. 1. c. 165et seq., 167 S. W.
967.

23
967

(1914) 258 Mo. 1. c. 171-172. 167 S. W.

1. (1926) 14 F. (2d) 83S.
2.

(1926) 14 F. (2d) 833.
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not a fair expression of opinion. But we believe that the case presents the
further questions not considered by the court; first, Can the judge express an
opinion as to material facts of which there is no evidence? and second, Was the
jilge's reference to fifteen year old girls at dances drinking liquor such a fair
and dispassionate comment as he is privileged to make?
I In England, 3 and in our federal courts, 4 it has long been'recognized that
the judge may express his opinion upon the evidence in strong terms, provided
he separates thelaw from the facts and makes clear to the jury that his opinion
as to the facts is merely advisory, and that they are free to exercise their independent judgment and may totally disregard his opinion. In a leading case s
frequently quoted by the federal courts, it is said that "a judge should not be
a mere automatic oracle of the law, but a living participant in the trial, and so
far as the limitations of his position permit should see that justice is done. But
his comments upon the facts should be judicial and dispassionate, and so carefully guarded that the jurors, who are the triers of them, may be left free to
exercise their independent judgment." This rule prevails in the courts of
some of the eastern
states, 6 but in most of the states this privilege has been
7
denied by statute.
The power of the federal judge to comment upon the evidence is very
broad, and his opinion may be expressed in strong terms. Thus, thejudge has been
permitted to say s that "the court's opinion is that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged." A judgment was affirmed in a case in which the judge saido
"in my judgment, in this case it was a plain case of a man violating the prohibition law by dealing in alcohol. This story (defendant's) ..... does not
appeal to the judgment of this court as being credible. I have no faith in that
3. Belcher v. Prittie, (1834) 4 Moore & Scott
295, 3 L. J. C. P. 85; Foster v. Steele, (1837) 5
Scott 28, 6 L. J.C.P. 265; Davidson v. Stanley
(1841) 2 Man. & G. 721, 3 Scott (N.R.) 49.
4. Carver v. Jackson (1430) 4 Pet. 1, 80,7 L. Ed.
761; Mag iac v. Thomson (1833) 7 Pet. 348, 8 L.
Ed. 709.
S. Ruddv. U.S.(1909) 173 F. 912,97C. C.A.
462.
6. Ware v. Ware, (1831) 8 Me. 42, 59; Mans.
field v. Corbin (1849), 4 Cush. (Mass.) 213;
Flanders v. Colby, (1853) 28 N. H. 34, 39; State
v. Hummer (1906) 73 N. J. L. 714, 65 Atl 249;
Rowell v. Fuller's Estate, (1887) 59 Vt. 688, 10
Ati. 853; Hurlburt v. Hurlburt. (1891) 128 N. Y.
420, 28 N. E. 651; Houghton v. City of New
Hav n (1907) 79 Conn. 659, 66 Atl. 509, Ditmars
v. Commonwealth (1864) 47 Pa. St. 335.
7. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 4038 provides: "The
court shall not, on the trial of the issue in any
criminal case, sum up or comment upon the
evidence, or charge the jury as to matter of fact,
unless requested to do so by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel; but the
court may instruct the jury in writing on any
point of law arising in the cause." This statute
has existed since 1845.
In charging the jury, the federal judge is not
bound to conform to the rule applicable to the
state courts of the state in which he is sitting.
even though it was declared by act of Congress

of June 1, 1872, (17 Stat. 197. sec. 5) "that the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding in other than equity and admiralty
causes, in the circuit and district courts of the
United States, shall conform as near as may be" to
the same things "existing at the time in like
causes in the courts of record of the State within
which such circuit and district courts are held,"
Nudd v. Burrows, (1875) 91 U. S. 426. 23 L. Ed.
286; Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co., v. Putman (1886)
118 U. S. 545, 30 L. Ed. 2S7. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
for a trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions.
"Jury" has been interpreted by the courts of the
United States to mean the English common law
jury, because this was the only kind of a jury
known to the framers at the time' of the
adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. The English common law jury was a
jury which was subject to being charged by the
judge both as to law and as to facts. Thus this
amendment impliedly provides that in the courts
of the United States the judge may express an
opinion on the evidence to the jury, because that
was one of the characteristics of the common law
jury. Therefore, the practice conformity act Is
inoperative to limit a power of the judge impliedly
granted by the Constitution.
8. Dillon v. U. S. (1921) 279 F. 639, 642.
9. Wiederman v. U. S. (1926) 10 F. (2d) 745.
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statement, butI believe that theofficers told the truth ..... " It has even been
held that ajudge might go so far as to say0 "but I would be derelict in my duty
if I did not say to you that, from my standpoint and viewpoint, this testimony,
irresistibly and irrefutably points to the absolute guilt of these defendants"
when such comment was coupled with an equally strong statement that the
jury were not bound by his opinion. Again when the judge saidu, "I do not
see any way that these defendants can be acquitted", it was held not to be
reversible error, although this comment was disapproved on appeal.
But this power is not unlimited. It is difficult to lay down a general rule
or establish a definite standard by which we can tell whether the comment in
a particular case is within the limitations. "where the line must be drawn
between comment upon the evidence of facts which is and that which is not
permissible is determinable only by an examination of thelanguage and a consideration of the circumstances of each particular case."U In the case under
review, the judge surpassed the limits of proper comment. The first question
is suggested by the statement in the opinion that "the court stated that he
drew certain inferences, and expresses the opinion that certain material facts
were true, although . ... 'there is no evidence of that.' " While the judge has
broad powers, it is clear that his comments upon the evidence must be limited
to facts which have actually been brought out by the evidence in the case, and
he cannot infer that certain facts are true unless evidence has been actually
presented from which such inference might legally be made. In a case0 in which
the defendant was prosecuted for selling intoxicating liquor, and his employees
testified in his behalf, the judge stated "Personally, I am inclined to believe
practically all of them (defendant's witnesses) were engaged in the business
out there." This was held to be an improper comment, because there was no
evidence in the case on which to base such a belief. In another case," the
defendant was charged with conspiracy to keep negroes from voting. No
evidence of his character was introduced. The judge said "If... anybody ....
desired to have colored men deprived of the right of voting ..... it is not improbable that just such men as these defendants would be chosen to carry that
object into execution." Court held that this comment was improper because it was outside of the testimony. The rule laid down by a state court
which allows this privilege, was approved by the Supreme Court. 6 In that case,
the judge drew deductions and theories, "which, if not wholly unsupported,
should have been left for the jury." It was there held that "deductions and
theories not warranted by the evidence should be studiously avoided."
The second question suggested by this case is whether the charge of the
court was such a fair, judicial, and dispassionate comment as he is privileged to
make, or, whether it was an appeal to the passions and prejudices of thejury.
In one case, 17 a defendant, whose religion sanctioned polygamy, was indicted
for bigamy. The judge directed the attention of the jury to "the consequences
to the innocent victims of this delusion. As this contest goes on, they multiply,
and there are pureminded women and there are innocent children ....

These

are to be the spfferers ... ." In affirming the conviction, the court said, "while
10. Morsev. U. S. (1918) 255 F. 681.
11. Endleman et al. v. U. S. (1898) 86 F. 456,
462, 30 C. C. A. 186.
12. Stokes v. U. S. (1920) 264 F. 18. 25.
13. Kolp v. U. S. (1924) 2 F. (2nd) 953.
14. Mullen v. U. S. (1901) 106 F. 892.46 C. C.
A. 22.

15. Burke v. Maxvell's Admrs. (1876) 81 Pa.
St. 139. 153.
16. Starr v. U. S. (1894) 153 U. S. 614.14S.
Ct. 919, 38 L. Ed. 841.
17. Reynolds v. U.S. (1878) 98 U.S. 14S, 167.
25 L. Ed. 244.
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every appeal by the court to the passions or the prejudices of a jury should be
promptly rebuked .... we see no just cause for complaint in this case."
In another case,18 the defendant was convicted of violation of the Espionage
Act. Assignments for error relate to language used inthe charge of the judge
which defendant claimed tended to inflame and divert the jury. The language
was used by way of illustration and explanation, and covered certain situations
shown in the evidence which were not the particular ones covered by the indictment. In holding the comment improper, and reversing the judgment, the
court said that justice should not be defeated by a confusion of issues due to
patriotic sentiment and the jury's hatred of unpatriotic acts in general.
In the instant case, the judge's charge was an appeal to the passions and
the prejudices of thejury. He might have unduly influenced them against the testimony of the deputy sheriff by picturing to them immoral conditions which
would result from leaving the enforcement of the law in such hands as his.
Since there was no evidence in the case of fifteen year old girls at dances drin king liquor, his charge was not a judicial and dispassionate comment on the
evidence in the case, but was an appeal to the passions of the jury, which was
not within the power of the judge.
The charge of the court must not partake of the nature of a partisan argument for either side. The judge is not permitted to attempt to persuade the
jury as to the facts, or to throw the weight of his influence on the side of the
prosecution by arguing the case for the government. In a prosecution under
the Mann Act, the judge was not permitted to say 12 that to him the testimony
of the defendant was wholly unreasonable, and that personally, he "would
rather believe thegirlwho had beenwronged than the man who would desert his
wife and children to wrong her." This was held "to have the aspect of argument and advocacy beyond the permissible limit." In another case,", the
defendant had been convicted of the murder of an officer who had attempted
to arrest him under a warrant. The judge charged "How unjust, how cruel,
what a mockery, what a shame, what a bloody crime it would be upon the part
of this government to sent a man out into that Golgotha of officers, and command them in the solemn name of the President of the United State to execute
these processes, and say to them: Men may defy you; men may arm themselves
and hold you at bay; they may obstruct your process; they may intimidate
your execution of it; they may hinder you in making the arrest; they may
delay you in doing it by threats of armed violence upon you, and yet I am
unable as chief executive of this government to assure you that you have any
protection whatever" ..... The Supreme Court (of the United States) said
that "argumentative matter of this sort should not be thrown into the scales
by the judicial officer who holds them." The charge of the judge should not be
one-sided,21 but possible deductions in favor of the defendant should be made
as well as those against him. The charge must be fair, and only such comments
may be made as are justified by the circumstances of the particular case.
However, the judge has been permitted to stress2 ' "the importance of the case,
because of the 'letting down of the bars' protecting property rights and the lowering of the standards of honesty", provided the duty of law enforcement was
coupled with the duty of seeing that no innocent man was convicted.
18. Wolf v. U. S.(1919) 259 U. S.388.
19. Parker v. U. S. (1924) 2 F. (2d) 710.
20. Starr v. U. S.(1894) 153 U. S.614, 626,
14 S.Ct. 919, 38 L. Ed. 244.

21. Hickory v. U.S. (1895) 160U. S. 408,421.
16 S.Ct. 327, 40 L. Ed. 474.
22. U. S. v. Freedman (1920) 268 F. 65S.
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The court cannot use such language in his charge to the jury that he
leaves with them the impression that they will be held up to ridicule, or that
they will be deceived if they render a verdict contra to the views expressed in
the charge. In one case, 23 the defendant was convicted of using the mails to
defraud in selling the right to handle a certain machine. The machine was
highly impractical, but the defendant testified that he honestly believed in its
efficiency, and had no intent to defraud. The judge charged that no one with
the slightest degree of intelligence above insanity could believe that the
machine was practical. The court reversed the conviction, because "the jury
may have believed a finding for the accused would have subjected them to
ridicule." It was'not sufficient that the words were withdrawn and the jury
instructed that the question was for them. Again, the judge was not permitted
to tell the jury24 that they were not to be "hoodwinked and bamboozled" by
unreasonable testimony when it was clear that he referred to the defendant's
testimony. And when the judge told the jury" that they were "not to be
misled or deceived by any subterfuge which may be resorted to by the defendant for the purpose of escaping the penalty... .", this was held to be a "disparagement of the defense", which could not be regarded as that judicial discussion which alone he is permitted to make.
The judge must leave the jury clearly to understand that they are free
to exercise their own independent judgment. He cannot use such language in
his comment upon the evidence that ajury might reasonably believe that they
are bound by his views. Thus, the court was not permitted to say"a that in
his opinion, it was the duty of the jury to convict the defendant," or that "the
evidence was legally conclusive against" the defendait2? even though he thereafter cautioned them that they were free to exercise their own judgment, because these expressions were such that the jury might have believed that they
were binding. In a case2s in which the defendant had fled after the crime was
committed, the judgie charged that "the law recognizes another proposition as
true, and it is that 'the wicked flee, when no man pursueth, but the innocent
are as bold as a lion.' That is a self-evident proposition that has been recognized so often by mankind that we can take it as an axiom and apply it to this
case." This charge was held to be erroneous, because it left the impression
with the jury that if they found the defendant fled it was their duty to convict.
Any strong expression of opinion which the judge may desire to make
should be made before the jury retire from the bar, because his right to comment at a later stage is more narrowly limited. In one casei g, the jury returned
after they had been out some time, unable to agree. Thejudge said, "I feel that
the court should have advised you, before you retired, that you should return
a verdict of guilty in this case." It was held that "this statement, if made in
the course of the original charge, safeguarded it as it was ..... would have been
within the province of the court .... Coming at this state of the trial, however, it was inopportune, and was calculated to carry with it undue influence
upon the jury."
The power of the judge to express his opinion upon the evidence is one
of the most valuable features of the practice in the federal courts, and its aid
23. Ruddv. U.S. (1909) 173 F. 912,97 C.C.A.
462.
24. Carney v. U. S.(1924) 295 F. 606.
25. Wallace v. U.S. (1923) 291 F. 972.
26. Breese v. U.S. (1901) 108 F. 804,48 C. C.

A. 36.
27. Cumnins v. U.S. (1916) 232 F. 844.
28. Hickory v. U. S. (1695) 160 U. S.409, 422,
16 S. Ct. 327,40 L. Ed. 474.
29. Lewis v. U.S. (1925) 8 F. (2d) 849.
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in the administration ofjustice is great. From the judge comes the only expert
impartial aid that the jury receive in rendering the verdict. In state courts, the
jury is frequently left to pass upon a mass of evidence and conflicting testimony
lasting for several days, which they are unable to keep in mind. They are left
to decide a question of fact which would be difficult for a trained mind. Sometimes they are left to the mercy of unscrupulous overly zealous attorneys, and
the jury, which tries to decide the question correctly, is unable to properly decide because they have not been given the proper assistance. And the public
wonders why more criminals are not convicted. When our judges become autocratic lords of oppression then we may fear this power of comment. But, at
present, it is unfortunate that the circuit judges in Missouri are not permitted
to say a single word by way of summing up or commenting on the evidence.
G. F. W.
MORTGAGES-TITLE BY ESTOPPEL BY DEED. Ellsberry v. Duval.
Percival Trust Co.,
One Johnson purported to convey land by warranty deed to one Smiley,
who, in turn, conveyed by deed of trust by way of mortgage to defendant to se.
cure a note. The first of these deeds Was recorded at 3:10 p. m. and the second at
3:15 p.m. on March 26, 1924. Johnson, when he conveyed to Smiley did not
have title to the land nor did he appear on the record as the owner thereof.
As a matter of fact, the only interest which he had in the property at that time
was under a contract, which he had entered into with one Wealand whereby
Wealand had bound herself to execute a warranty deed to him, aald he, in~turn,
had agreed to give Wealand a deed of trust, covering the same land, to secure
the purchase price. After defendant took its deed of trust from Smiley, Wealand, pursuant to her contract, conveyed the land to Johnson, and Johnson
gave the stipulated deed of trust at Wealand's request to plaintiff. Wealand's
deed to Johnson was recorded at 3:45 p. m. on March 26, 1924, and Johnson's
deed of trust to plaintiff at 3:50 p. m. on the same day. This action was brought
to determine whether plaintiff's lien was prior to that of defendant's. Plaintiff's
had a decree in the Circuit Court, and upon appeal to the Springfield Court of
Appeals, the decree of the Court below was affirmed, it being held that defendant's claim under its deed of trust from Smiley was junior to plaintiff's lien,
given by Johnson under his deed of trust to secure the purchase price due to
Wealand.
At common law, if A were to grant and convey Blackacre to B by warranty
deed, he not having title himself at the time of the conveyance, any title that
A might subsequently acquire would immediately pass to B; this later title
was said to inure to B's benefit upon principles of estoppel bydeed.2 Moreover,
1. (1926) 282 S.W. 1054.
2. "At common law there were two classes
of cases in which an estateactually paufed by
estoppel, and two only. The first of these was a
feoffment, fine or common recovery. These acts
were of such solemnity that they always passed
an actual estate and divested the feoffor or conusorand his heirsof whateverestate theythen had
and also of any estate that they night later acquire. The second was where the assurance was by
lease under which estates could take effect in the
future. There was an ordinary and an extraordinary effect attached to an estoppel. One was

personal and estopped the grantor from doing
anything contrary to the tenor of his sealed Instrument. The other-the extraordinary effectpossessed the high functionof actually transferring
every estate to the feoffee, conusee or lessee that
the grantor might acquire." Rawle, Covenants
for Title, (Sth Ed.) sec. 243-246.
"In the United States where the deed contains
recitals or averments relative to covenanting as
to the title, as a general rule any after-acquired
title will inure by virtue of the covenants to the
party claiming under the conveyance by direct
operation of law." Rawle, op. cit. Sec. 248.
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this would be the result even though A, after he actually got title, conveyed
the same to C, who took without actual notice of the prior conveyance to B.
The right, which B got under the warranty deed, was regarded as a legal right
and not a mere equity. Accordingly, B's interest was not cut off by C's bona
fide purchase.
Defendant, in the principal case, contended that plaintiff took Johnson's
title under the deed of trust subject to the prior deeds to Smiley and to itself.
To sustain this point, sec. 2198, R. S. 1919, and sec. 2199 id.were cited. Sec.
2198 makes it possible to record all instruments affecting title to real estate; sec.
2199 provides that "every instrument affecting real estate shall, from the time
of its filing, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof, and all purchasers and subsequent mortgagees shall be deemed in law and in equity to purchase with notice." But the Court held that these two statutory provisions
were of no avail to defeat plaintiff's rights. It was stated that the mere fact
that Johnson's deed to Smiley, and Smiley's deed to defendant were recorded
at the time when plaintiff acquired her interest in the land from Johnson did
not give plaintiff notice of defendant's claim against the land, andshe tookfree
from the same.
The result reached in the case under review is highly desirable; in fact, it
seems it to be the only one consistent with the scheme of our recordingstatute.
The statutes in substance purport to give assurance to one, who bonafide, and
for value, purchases a title to real estate, that he will take such title in the
condition that a proper search of the record reveals it to be in.' One who takes
title to real estate ought to be privileged to assume that any outstanding
titles, which due search of the record do not turn out, will be futile as against
him, if he purchases for value, and without notice. If an attempthas been made
to create an interest in the land by some deed or other instrument, and the
same is recorded, but a proper search of the record will not reveal it, no right
should vest under such attempt as against an innocent person, who has used
the means provided by statute for the ascertainment of the true state of the
land's title. If such undisclosed instrument is made effective as against such a
purchaser, the recording.statutes defeat their very purpose, and will mislead the
buying public. They will not make the condition of real estate titles an "open
story" available to all who take the trouble to make a diligent search.
The system of searching titles which the recording statutes invite' is to
trace the line of record title and "search against each owner during the period
that he held title." 6 If the record discloses a good title in a grantor or mortgagor
on a certain date "and nothing done by him after that time to impair or encumber the title" a grantee or mortgagee should not"be bound to inquire further back and to ascertain whether the vendor" or mortgagor "has done acts which
may impair his title prior to the time at which it was vested in him as indicated
by the record."' "No one is supposed to convey or encumber property which
3. Rawle, pp. cit. Sec. 259; White v. Patten,
24 Pick. (Mass.) 324.
4. See Ford v. Unity Church Society (1894)

ments affecting title to a parcel of land arc recorded on the same sheet in the registry book.
irrespective of who executes them. See Tiffany.

120 Mo. 498,25 S. W. 394; and Dodd v. Williams,
(1877) 3 Mo. App. 278.
5. But compare the usual grantor-grantee
indices method of registration of documents affecting land titles with the commonly called "lot
and block "system. Also compare with the "Tor-

Real Property (2nd Ed.) p. 1101.
6. See Ely v. Pingrey (189S) 56 Kan. 17. 42
Pac. 330; Bingham v. Kirkland (1881) 34 N. J.
Eq. 229. 234.
7. 2 Pomeroy. Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.) 1306: Tffany. Real Property (2nd Ed.) sec. S4Se

rens System".

In these systems all the instru-
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he does not own ....A person would therefore naturally fail to inquire what
some person had done about a property in which he had no interest." 8
In the principal case, at the time that Johnson gave his deed of trust to
plaintiff, he had just acquired title from Wealand, it would never occur to a
reasonable person that Johnson, prior to such time, could have affected this
title in such a way as to destroy plaintiff's rights, or that it was the duty of
plaintiff and Wealand to search the records of deeds as against Johnson to
ascertain whether or not he had granted away a title, which they knew was
not vested in him, but quite to the contrary in Wealand. The decision, therefore, is just and in accord with the probable weight of authority.,
Sec. 2266 R. S. 1919 provides that where a "grantor, by the terms of his
deed, undertakes to convey to his grantee an indefeasible estate in fee simple
absolute, and shall not, at the time of such conveyance, have the legal title to
the estate sought to be conveyed, but shall afterward acquire it, the legal estate
subsequently acquired by him shall immediately pass to the grantee; and such
conveyance shall be as effective as though such legal estate had been in the gran tor at the time of the conveyance." Defendant in the principal case claimed the
aid of this statute apparently urging that Johnson's deed to Smiley was within its operation so that his later-acquired title went to Smiley and from the
latter to defendant as of the date of the execution of Johnson's and Smiley's
respective deeds. The learned Court did not attempt to interpret this statute,
but disposed of this contention by saying that "Because of our recording law a
recorded deed executed by one who has not title, but who afterward acquires
the title by recorded deed, is not constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser
in good faith from the common grantor."' 10 Apparently, the Court felt that the
title by estoppel provided for in the statute, was to be limited to persons taking
with actual notice, or to grantees other than bonafide purchasers, when the
conveyance resulting in the estoppel, was out of the chain of title.
Certainly, such a construction of the above quoted statute is desirable,
but is it justified? The statute's language is broad and sweeping; it provides
that a grantor's future acquired title shall vest apparently in all grantees and
"shall be as effective as though such title had been in the grantor [not a grantor within the record title] at the time of the conveyance." Literally construed,
there is nothing in the statute's wording to restrict the scope of its operation
in the way that the Court did limit it.
The statute contains some rather unusual provisions. In order that a
grantor's subsequently acquired title may inure to a grantee's benefit, it requires the grantor to undertake to convey an "indefeasible estate in fee simple
absolute." At the same time, if such an estate is granted, it seems that there
will be an estoppel, even though the grant or conveyance is not by way of
warranty deed.
At common law a grantee of any quantum of estate would take a title
later acquired by his grantor." Does the Missouri statute plan to limit the
common law principles of title by estoppel to transactions where the title
8. Bingham v. Kirkland, supra note 6. 34 N.
J. Eq. I. c. 234.
9. Taylor v. Debar (1910) 1 Ch. Cas. 374; In
re Bridgewater's Settlement (1910)2 Ch.Cas. 342;
Hannon v. Christopher (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 459;
Builders' Sash and Door Co. v. Joyner (1921)
182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259, 25 A. L. R. 81.
Calder v. Chapman (1865) 52 Penn. St. 359, ac-

cord.
10. Ford v. Unity Church Society, jupra note
4; Dodd v. Williams, supra, note 4; Conrey v.
Pratt (1913) 248 Mo. 576, 154 S.W. 749; Rogers
v. Tucker (1887) 94 Mo. 346.
11. Bigelow, Estoppel (5th Ed.) 38S, 414-419;
Co. Litt. 49a; Doe v. Oliver, 5 Man. & Ryl. 202,
3 Gray's Cas. Prop. 739.
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purported to be conveyed is an out and out fee simple? Suppose, for example,
that a life estate is conveyed, under an appropriate deed, will the grantee of
such an interest not take his grantor's later acquired title? Of course, if this
is the real meaning of the statute, a deed of trust does not convey an indefeasible title, and the defendant in the principal case could not have prevailed under
any conditionsU Again, at common law a.mere grant, without any warranty,
would give no title by estoppel.13 The Missouri statute does not specifically
require the grantor to warrant his title in order that his grantee may claim the
benefit of an estoppel. The statute provides for title by estoppel in all cases
where a grantor "undertakes" to convey. Is undertaking to convey synonymous with conveying a title and warranting the same? If this is not the case,
the statute considerably broadens the scope of operation of the orthodox rules
governing title by estoppel.14
In the principal case, the Court also justified its conclusion on another
ground, holding that where a grantee gives back to his grantor a purchase
money mortgage or deed of trust at the time that he takes title such purchase
money mortgage or deed of trust takes precedence over all liens created by the
grantee prior to such time. Such a decision seems entirely proper, and is in
accordwith the best authority.15 In such a transaction the purchaser and mort12. There have been relatively few cases in
Missouri where the courts actually construe the
meaning of the words in the statute. Perhaps a
resume of those cases would not be out of place
here.
In Gibson v. Chouteau, (1867) 38 Mo. 536,
a deed purporting to convey "all the right, title
and interest" of the grantor, was held to be a
mere quit-claim and not to pass after-acquired
title.
Likewise, in Valle v. Clemens (1853) 18 Mo.
486, a deed conveying the "interest of the grantors" was held not to convey after-acquired title.
That a warranty deed passes the after-acquired
title was held in Johnson v. Johnson (1902)
170 Mo. 34, 70 S. W. 241 and in St. J., St. L.,
& S. F. Ry. Co. (1902) 170 Mo. 327, 70 S. W.
700. The Court in Mathews v. O'Donnell (1921)
289 Mo. 270,233 S. W. 457, 1. c. 460, held that the
"doctrine of after-acquired title does not applyto a
married woman's deed (certainly not if the deed
was made prior to the Married Woman's Act of
1889) and without regard to the form of the deed,
only the interest that she had at its date passes
her grantee."
In Vance v. Humphreys (1922) 210 Mo. App.
498, 241 S. W. 91, where remaindermen whose
interest was contingent on their surviving a life
tenant for the purpose of dividing the land conveyed by general warranty to each other Aeld,
"as soon as the title passes to the remaindermen
on the death of the life tenant, it will pass to their
grantees." In Graham v. Finerty (1921) 232 S. W.
129, it was held that "under a deed of trust of land
held by the entireties containing statutory covenants of "grant, bargain and sell", on the death of
the wife her interest thereby acquired by the
husband passed by inurement to purchasers on
foreclosure of the tru st deed."

In Millerson v. Doherty Land & Cattle Co.
(1922) 241 S. W. 907, it was held that where a
purchaser of county land executed a deed to a
third party before he reeived the patent from
the county the title acquired after issuance of the
patent inured to the benefit of the grantee. But
it is evident from the above cases that the statute
is not intended to apply strictly to the conveyance
of a fee simple. The cases summarized above
seem to hold that a mere quit-claim deed wll not
operate to convey after-acquired title, but any
deed containing the statutory covenautsof"grazt,
bargain and sell" or purporting to convey a definite estate as distinguished from a conveyance of
the grantor's present interest will work such an
inurement of title.
However, the holdings of the Missouri courts
should not be taken as reprenseting an approval
of the doctrine of estoppel as represented by the
decision of Tefft v. Munson (1874) 57 N. Y. 97,
which is the leading case of a line of decitsons that
utterly disregards the interest of a Lonafidt purchaser of land from a grantor who has conveyed
the land prior to his acquisition of title and holds
that the one to whom it was previously conveyed
takes title. The Missouri courts are inclined to
protect the bonafid- purchaser and to hold that
the one purchasing previously to his grantor's
acquisition of title merely acquires an equitable,
as distinguished from a legal, title.
13. Right d. Jeffreys v. Bucknell, 2 Barn. &
Adolph. 278; Kenuedyv.Skeer,3 Watts (Penn.) 98.
14. Bigelow, op ci. 429; Rawle, op.cit sec. 248.
15. Wendler v. Lambeth (1901) 163 Mo.428,
63 S.W 684; Eyre v. Burmester (1865) 10 IL L.
CaB. 90, Scott's Cas. on Trusts671; Kelleyv.Jensen (1862) 50 Me. 455; Rogers v. Tucker, supra
note 10; Burchard v. Hubbard (1812) 10 Oh. St.
Rep. 316.
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gagor, had merely instantaneous seisin or title. He got it merely to give the
same back as security; in substance, it is as if he never had title; as if the grantor and seller had never parted with the same. Surely, before any one can
claim through a grantee, it should appear that the latter has acquired a beneficial interest in land. It seems obvious that a grantee, who has immediately
upon receipt of title mortgaged the land back to his selling grantor to secure the
purchase price, has not gotten, and will not gain any beneficial ownership in
the land until the price secured by the mortgage has been duly discharged.
B. F. B.
FIRE INSURANCE--INSURABLE INTEREST- EFFECT OF INSURED'S
MISREPRESENTATION UPON ASSIGNEE'S RIGHTS. Haywardv. Fidelity
Phoenix Fire Ins. Co.,
In December, 1922 one M owned an elevator, which he "sold" to A,
it being agreed that M should hold title to the premises until A could find a purchaser. At the time of this agreement the property was insured with defendant in
favor of M, and it was arranged between the parties that M should not disclose
to defendant A's interest under the contract, because A feared that defendant
would not continue the insurance if it became known that the premises had
come "into the hands of a trader."' 2 In February, 1923, A, had not as yet found
a purchaser, and M's insurance with defendant was about to expire. M, accordingly, renewed the same with defendant, but made no disclosure of the
fact that he held the property for A under the contract made in December,
1922, apparently leading defendant to believe that he was still the absolute
owner. Thereafter in August, 1923, A induced plaintiff to purchase the property, and M conveyed the same to plaintiff, at the same time assigning to
the latter the insurance policy, which he had secured from defendant in February
1923. Defendant consented to this assignment. Plaintiff, at the time that he
thus acquired the property and the insurance policy by way of assignment,
did not know of M's misrepresentations to defendant, and had not been aware
of the fact that title to the property was in M until the latter conveyed the
property to him. Plaintiff did not know in what capacity A had been acting
in the matter (whether as principal or as agent) until he took his deed from M
After plaintiff acquired title to the elevator, it was destroyed by fire, and this
action was brought upon the policy, issued originally to M, and assigned by
him as aforesaid to plaintiff.
Defendant pleaded M's fraud as a defense to this action, claiming also
that M, after he had contracted to hold title to the insured premises for A, had
no insurable ir.terest in the premises. But plaintiff had judgmfnt in the Court
below, which was affirmed by the Kansas City Court of Appeals. It was held:
(1) that plaintiff did have an insurable interest; (2) that defendant could not
avail itself of M's fraud in misrepresenting the true state of the title to
the insured premises because it had not elected to rescind the contract of
insurance, and offered to return the premiums that had been paid by M;
and (3) that "when an assignment of the fire policy to a purchaser of the insured
property has been consented to by the company, a new and independent contract arises between the insurer and the assignee, and the policy is not affected
by the fraud of the party originally insured."'
1. (1926) 285 S. W. 144.
2. (1926) 285 S. W. 1. c. 145.

3.

(1926) 285 S. W. I. c. 146.
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I
At the time that M. insured the premises with defendant under the policy
in suit, he was in the position of a trustee, being obligated to hold the property
for A, and to convey to any person that A might designate. It has been held
that a trustee has an insurable interest, and there seems to be no dissent from
this proposition. This is said to be so even though the trustee is under no duty
to insure the trust property and has no pecuniary interest in it himself. The
right to insure exists, under such conditions, because he should be privileged to
protect the beneficiary from loss so that the trust property, or its value, in the
event of its destruction by fire, may be turned over to the latter, when called.
for.' Clearly such a contract of insurance is unobjectionable, because the trustee,
if he does insure, does so for the benefit of the cestui que trust and is responsible
to him for any insurance collected. It is accordingly urged that the decisions
to the effect that a trustee has an insurable interest are sound.
Conceding that M, had an insurable interest in the property covered by
defendant's policy, the question is what was the effect of M's deliberately concealing his actual interest from defendant upon the latter's obligation under the
policy to pay for the loss? It is probable that the policy contained a provision
to the effect that it should be void if the interest of the insured in the property
was not truly disclosed at the time of procuring the policy. Does such a stipulation ipso facto vitiate the policy, where, as in the principal case, the insured
has fraudulently concealed the true state of the title, and falsely represented
himself to be the true owner? Some courts have taken this position, holding
that the condition in the policy is self-operating, and that the insured has no
rights thereunder5
On the other hand, a good many courts have taken the position that"void"
as used in the policy does not mean that the policy is a nullity, but that the
insurer may avoid the sameta at his election, within a reasonable time after
discovering the insured's fraud, but that to do so there must be a complete rescission of the agreement, which involves a return of premiums that have been
paid in advance.6 Courts, which hold to this view, argue that where the insured
has an insurable interest, the insurer if inclined so to do, may elect to regard
the policy as valid and waive the insured's fraud. If the insurer may elect to
continue the policy, it is because there was a good and subsisting contract
until avoided, and it could be avoided only by positive action on the part of
the insurer amounting to rescission. Such a line of reasoning seems sound, and
the decision in the principal case is proper. Certainly, if the insurance policy4. Dick v. Franklin Insurance Co. 1883) 81
Mo. 103; Travis v. Continental Insurance Co.
(1888) 32 Mo. App. 198; Insurance Co. v. Chase
(1866)5 Wall. (U. S.)
509, lOL. Ed. 524; Lucena v.
Crawford (1802) 3 Bos.Pul.75; Wood, Fire Insurante (2nd Ed.) Section 306; Vance, Insurance, Sction47;3 Kent's Commentaries (11th Ed.) 460 di
uge;
See Warren v. Indemnity Insurance Co. (1871)
45 N. Y. 606-612 for a valuable discussion of the
principle underlying the proposition stated in the
text. The case discusses a similar question.
S. National Insurance Co. v. Duncan (1908)
44 Colo. 472; American Cent. Insurance Co. v.
Antram (1905) 86 Miss. 224, 38 So. 626.
Sa. Burch v. Globe Mutual Ins. Co. (1862)

31 Mo.S46; Keetv. Roundtree Dry GoodsCo.(1903) 100 Mo.App.S04,74S.W.469;Bakerv.N.Y.
Life Ina.Co. (1896) 77 Fed. 550; Turnerv.Merid.
ian Ins. Co. (1873) 16 Fed. 454; Excelsor Mutual
Aid Assn. v. Riddely (1883) 91 Ind. 84; Eagle
Fire Ins. Co. v. Le Wallen (1908) 47 So. 947.
6. Union Trust Co. of St. Louisv. Wash. Ins.
Co. (1899) 79 Mo. App. 362; Phoenix Ins. Co.v.
Grove (190S) 215 1U. 299,74 N. E. 141; "Culyar
the defendant insurance company could not asin a right to the premium for valid insurance
and at the same time assert the insurance had
never been effected." New Jersey Rubber Co. v.
Insurance Co. (1900) 64 N. J. L. SEO, 46 AtL 477
dictum.
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was merely voidable as against M it was likewise merely voidable as against
M's innocent assignee, plaintiff.
II
The Court states in the case under review, probably by way of dictum, that
where a person purchases property and takes an assignment of an insurance
policy covering the same, the insurer consenting to the assignment, such policy
is valid in the hands of the purchaser and assignee, in spite of any misrepresentations as to ownership that the assignor may have made to the insurer, when
originally procuring the insurance. This is the usual holding, if the assignor had
an insurable interest, when he got his policy. Such a rule reaches a desirable
result. "It is customary for the seller to transfer to the purchaser his policy;
and it would be ahard rule to hold such purchaser and transferee liable for the
delinquencies of the party originally insured." 7 In fact, no good purpose would
be furthered by penalizing the purchaser because he has an insurable interest,
and the misrepresentation made by the assignor has in no way injured the insurer. If, therefore, the insurer can be held for a loss suffered by the assignee,
consistently with principle, it will be desirable so to do.
It is usually said that the insurer is liable to the assignee, who has purchas.
ed the property, if the insurer consents to the assignment, because a new con.
tract comes into being between the insurer and the assignee when the assignment is permitted. The proposition is that the insurer agrees to continue the
insurance in favor of the assignee for the time mentioned in the policy, pursuant to the original terms thereof. Curiously enough, the situation has not
often been critically examined and analyzed by the courts, the matter having
been dismissed by the mere assertion that there is a new contract between
the insurer and the assignee. Is it possible to find the elements of a new contract in such a transaction as it normally occurs in?
Take, for example, the transaction in the principal case, which is believed
to be typical; it is easy, of course, to construe defendant's consent to M's assignment to plaintiff as a promise to pay the latter in the event of a subsequent
loss covered by the assigned policy; it is easy, also, to find that plaintiff accepted such promise, but is there any consideration to support the same? It
must be remembered that the premiums were paid by M. at the time the policy
was issued to him; what has plaintiff afforded since then, which we may call
consideration so as to make defendant's promise part of a new and binding
contract?
A contract of insurance, prior to the time that a loss has accrued thereunder, is not freely assignable. The insured cannot at pleasure place another
in his stead and insist that the insurer continue his liability to such other
person. The insurer is privileged to refuse to continue the contract, but in
such event, he would be bound to return any unearned premium to the insured's
assignee.$ The assignment is effective only to the extent of giving the assignee
a right to have the unearned premium paid to him. It would seem that this
would be the case even though the contract was voidable in the hands of the
assignor, because of his misrepresentation as to his interest in the insured
property, provided he had some insurable interest in the same. If this be a
correct analysis of the parties' rights, plaintiff, in the case under review, could
have demanded of defendant a return of the unearned premium, and defendant
would have been bound to return the same. On the other hand, plaintiff
7. Bayless v. Merchants Ins. Co. (1904)
106 Mo. App. 684, 688, 80 S.W. 269.

8. Bealner v. Ins. Co. (1917) 193 S. W. 847;
Ellis v. Ins. Co. (1887) 32 Fed. 646.
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could have waived this right, and, in consideration thereof, defendant could
have promised to continue the insurance in favor of plaintiff according to the
terms of the original policy for the time mentioned therein. Under such circumstances defendant in effect would have said: "Let us keep the unearned
premium, and we will insure you in place of M. M's contract is wiped out and
anew one is now made with you identical in its terms with the old one."
Such courts, as have carefully considered this situation, have said that the
new contract between the assignee and the insurer is that suggested in the last
paragraph; that the insurer agrees to continue the insurance in return for the
assignee's waiver of his right to a return of the unearned premiums.9 Certainly
such a contract could have been made. Certainly the assignee did have a right
to a return of the unearned premiums, and he did not get them back. His not
getting them back could have constituted consideration for the insurer's promise
to continue the insurance. It appears doubtful, however, if the assignee was
conscious of what he was doing. It is not believed that theaveragelaymdn realizes that, when the insurer consents to an assignment, that he is surrendering
his legal right to return of the unearned premium, due under the policy, as consideration for new insurance. The case then is one where the courts find that
there could have been consideration, and, therefore, hold that that which might
have been bartered away was in fact sold. As already remarked, the result of
the decision is desirable and the courts take this position in order to hold the
insurer to his solemn promise upon which the assignee has reasonably relied.
Suppose that A, having no insurable interest in property, nevertheless
procures insurance thereon; that thereafter B obtains title to the property,
takes an assignment of the policy issued to A, and the insurer consents to the
assignment; may B recover under the policy in the event of a subsequent loss?
It would be possible for A to have taken the policy either innocently, believing
that he had an insurable interest, or fraudulently misrepresenting that he had
such, knowing that in fact he did not. In the case where A knew that he had
no insurable interest and deliberately misrepresented the condition of the title
to the insurer, the cases hold, for the most part, that B may not recover under
the policy even though he himself was innocent in taking the assignment of the
policy, and relied upon the insurer's consent to the assignment.10 The ruling is
justified by saying that the contract, which A made with the insurer, was unenforceable because in the nature of a wager; that under a wagering contract
the parties will be left where they are, and no one has the legal right to recover
money paid under such a transaction. From this proposition it is easy to say
that when A passed the policy on to B, he gave B no rights thereunder to
have any premium paid back to him, and accordingly B surrendered no right
to the insurer and afforded no consideration for the latter's promise to continue
the insurance.
Technically, the decision, which denies the assignee any rights under the
policy under the assumed conditions may be justified, but it seems most unjust, if the assignee was innocent of any fraud, and believed (as he did) that
9. Ins. Co.v. Bambrick Cons. Co. (1912) 166
Mo. App. 504, 143 S.W. 845; Elis. InsuraneCo.
(1887) 32 Fed. 646; Ins. Co. v.Munns (1889) 120
Ind. 30; Steen v.Niagara Ins. Co. (1882) 89 N. Y.
314; Shearman v. Ins. Co. (1871) 46 N. Y. 526
Hooper v. Ins. Co. (1858) 17 N. Y. 424; Ins. Co.v.
Gunter (1896) 35S. W. 715; Corpusiuris, Vol.26, p.

134; (1912) 22 Jurid. L. Rev. 224. Wilson v.Hill
(1841) 3 Metc. (Mass.) 66.
10. Frohleyv.Ins.Co.(1888)32Mo.App.302;
Jecko v. Ins. Co. (1879) 7 Mo. App. 308; Meril v.
Ins. Co. (1863) 48 Me. 28S; Eastman V.IL. Co.
(18S9) 4S Me. 307; Ins. Co.v. Doll (1871) 3S Md.
90: McClusky v. Ins. Co.(1879) 126 MaLs. 30&
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the insurer was continuing a valid policy. It is highly probable that the assignee never gave the question of the assignor's having an insurable interest
any thought whatever, and to make the validity of the former's right to compensation dependent upon this fact, when he himself has such an interest, and
the insurer has been paid his premium, seems to inflict a real injustice upon
him. Of course, if the assignee's rights must be based upon the technical
doctrine of consideration, the result which the cases reach seems unavoidable.
The assignee furnished no consideration whatever. But why is there not room
for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel? Certainly the insurer
has represented to the assignee that the insurance is valid and the assignee has
relied upon this representation to his detriment. The writer realizes that the
normal rule is that no rights will be predicated upon a promissory estoppel.
If A promises to pay B $1,000, receiving nothing in return for the same, B
may not enforce the promise, even though he believes that A will pay him,
and changes his position under such belief. Such a doctrine is perhaps sound,
but the reason for the rule is that our economic policy is that a promise must be
bought and paid for; if A gets nothing in return for'his promise he will not be
held to the same. We need not quarrel with that proposition to estop the insurer in
the assumed case, however, because here the insurerhas been paid;he was paid
by the assignor, and his representation to the assignee in effect is: "the assignor
paid me for a good contract of insurance, and I agree to substitute you in his
place." It would seem that the assignor might be protected in this way, and
that by so doing no important policy would be violated, and at the same time
the assignee's reasonable expectations would be fulfilled.
In the case where the assignor had no insurable interest, but believed that
he did have, perhaps the assignee may be protected under a more or less orthodox doctrine. The reason why a party who pays money under a wagering agreement cannot recover the same is, because he is at fault, and the policy of the
law is to penalize him by leaving him where he has placed himself. It is a
means adopted by the law, which is calculated to discourage wagers. The bettor
may not enforce the promise given to him, neither will the law help him to
extricate himself from the position into which he has gotten. But in the assumed case, the assignor was innocent; he was not conscious of the fact that
he was making a mere wager. Surely there is no justification for making an
example of such a person, nor any object in penalizing him; he has been guilty
of no fraud or improper conduct, and should therefore be allowed to recover
the premium that he has paid under mistake." If this is the case, then the
assignor did pass to the assignee, in the assumed case, the right to recover the
premium that he paid, and this could have been left with the insurer, upon
principles heretofore discussed, as consideration for a new contract of insurance
entered into at the time that the insurer consented to the assignment of the
policy.
C. F. S.
11. "While theinsured cannot recover unearned premiums on account of a void policy, if there
has been fraud practiced in its procurement, the
rule is otherwise where the holder is innocent. If
the risk never attached by reason of mistake, free
from any evil practices, the insured is entitled to a
return of the whole premium, for none of it was
earned." Per J. Goode, in Vinning v. Franklin

Insurance Co. (1901) 89 Mo. App. 323 (dictum.)
Stilwell v. Ins. Co. (1900) 83 Mo. App. 215;
Miller v. Ins. Co (1906) 97 Minn. 98, 106 N. W.
485; McCann v. Ins. Co. (1901) 177 Mass. 280;
58 N. E. 1026; Seaback v. Ins. Co. (1916) 247
Il1.516, 113 N. E. 862; Key v. Ins. Co. (1899) 107
Ia. 446, 78 N. W. 68.
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DEEDS OF TRUST-DUTIES OF TRUSTEE. Oakey o.Bond.'
Plaintiff, the owner of land subject to a deed of trust, brought suit to set
aside the trustee's deed on foreclosure because he had no notice of the sale until
after the land was sold by the trustee. The court, in passing on this point,
states that the "trustee proceeded to advertise the property in accordance with
the terms ofthe deed of trust when he was requested to do so by the owner
of the note. No further notice was required of him." The decision suggests a
brief note on the duties of a trusteein respect to a sale under the power in a
deed of trust.
A trustee is bound to act in good faith as, in exercising the power, he becomes the trustee of the debtor; he should adopt all reasonable means to render
the sale beneficial to the debtor; he cannot shelter himself under a bare literal
compliance with the conditions imposed by the terms of the power.2 But the
trustee is not required to give the owner personal notice of the intended sale,3
unless so required by the terms of the deed. 4 A sale, however, will be set aside
if procured by fraud in lulling the owner of the land into security by the promise
of the creditor not to sell without first making demand.5 Neither is a prior
lien holder required to inform the holder of a junior lien of his intentior. to sell
the property.6 The notice required by statute to be published is intended to
notify the community that a sale will take place in order that bidders may be
present to purchase the property. It is not designed to give notice to the owner,
hence the law imposes no duty on the trustee to give personal notice to the
former.
The Missouri statute provides that all sales under a power of sale shall
be made in the county where the land to be sold is situated, and not less
than twenty days' notice shall be given. By statute "the time within which
an act is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including
the last, if the last day be Sunday it shall be excluded."O This rule of computation applies to a notice of sale published by a trustee.10 It is further providedu
that "such notice shall set forth the date and book and page of the record of
such mortgage or deed of trust, the grantors, the time, terms and place of sale,
and a description of the property to be sold, and shall be given by advertisement" published as prescribed therein. Since a sale is made under a naked
power given in a deed, the trustee must be held to a strict compliance with
the terms and conditions prescribed; consequently, a corrected notice published
1. (1926) 286 S. W. 27. The evidence in the
case showed that on April 30 an installment of
interest matured on the note secured by the prop-.
erty; that early in May, plaintiff, the owner of
the land, received a postal card from the holder
of the note stating that the interest was past due
and asking that payment be made; that without
further notice the trustee advertised the property
for sale, and sold the same on June 10; that plaintiff had no actual notice of this sale until July 4,
when she attempted to collect rent from her
tenant, who then informed her that the property
had been old.
2. (1890) Cassady v. Wallace, 102 Mo. 575.
15 S. W. 138 (trustee did not give notice of his
intention to sell to a junior lien holder, as he had
agreedtodo. (1876) Stoffelv. Schroeder, 62Mo. 147
(sale at an earlier hour than usual).

3. (1894) Harlin v. Nation. 126 Mo. 97, 27
S. W. 330; (1874) DeJarmette v. DeGiverville,
56 Mo. 440; (1925) Moss v. Keary, 231 Mich. 295
204 N. W. 93; (1913) King v. Walker, 141 Ga.
63, 80S. E. 312.
4. (1896) Jopling v. Walton, 138 Mo. 485, 40
S. W. 99.
S. (1867) Clarkson v. Crecly. 40 Mo. 114.
,6. (1894) Hardwicke v. Hamilton, 121 Mo.
465, 26 S. W. 342.
7. (1874) DeJarnette v. DeGiverville, 56 Mo.
440.
8. See. 2235, R. S. Mo. 1919.
9. Sec. 7058. R. S. Mo. 1919.
10. 1895) Gray v. Worst, 129 Mo. 122, 31
S. W. 585.
11. Sec. 2236, R. S. Mo. 1919, as amended by
Laws of 1925, p. 140.
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for nineteen days instead of twenty is not sufficient.12 The notice given by
the trustee should contain such facts as reasonably to apprise the public of the
place, time and terms of sale, and of the property to be sold. But mere omissions
and inaccuracies in these respects, not calculated to mislead and working no
prejudice, will be disregarded.13 Accordingly there are a number of cases in
which the notice was held sufficient despite certain omissions and inaccuracies;"s
others have been held insufficient5A sale by the trustee passes the legal title notwithstanding the sale may
be in violation of the provisions of the deed or the notice be defective. 10 The
fact that a sale is irregular can be taken advantage of by the mortgagor, or
one claiming under him, only by an action to redeem. 17 Since the trustee is a
fiduciary, he must in person supervise the sale; he cannot delegate the trust
or power to a third person." A sale, therefore, made in the absence of the
trustee by his agent is improper.19 He should use all reasonable efforts and
methods to make the sale bring as much as possible;0 hence a sale at an unusual hour is not valid.21 As the place of sale is usually at the county coult
house, there are a number of cases which attempt to define the "court house
door."22
R. M. F.
12. (1891) Wolff v. Ward, 104 Mo. 127, 16 S.
W. 161.
13. (1895) Noland v. Bank, 129Mo. 57,31 S.
W. 341; (1872) Stephenson v. January, 49 Mo.
465; (1867) Powers v. Kueckhoff, 41 Mo. 425.
14. (1918) Swearengin v. Swearengin, 202 S.
W. 556 (date of deed of trust incorrectly stated);
(1917) Speer v. Graham, 199 S. W. 139 (page of
record incorrectly stated in the first advertisement); (1914) Commerce Trust Co. v. Ellis, 258
Mo. 702, 167 S. W. 974 (failure to recite book and
page of record); (1901) Baker v. Cunningham, 162
Mo. 134, 62 S. W. 445 (date of deed of trust incorrectly stated); (1895 Noland v. Bank, 129
Mo. 57, 31 S. W. 341 (error in description of
the property, but description was sufficient to
inform the public of the property to be sold);
(1895) Gray v. Worst, 129 Mo. 122, 31 S. W. 585
(thirty days' notice); (1892) Wilkerson v. Eilers,
114 Mo. 245, 21 S. IV. 514 (advertisement in two
papers, where there was a consolidation); (1891)
Meier v. Meier, 105 Mo. 411, 16 S. W. 223 (hour
of sale not given); (1887) Munson v. Ensor, 94
Mo. 504, 7 S. W. 108 (notices signed in name of
trustee by an attorney); (1880) The German
Bank v. Stumpf, 73 Mo. 311 ("thirty days'
notice in a daily paper" does not mean thirty
days' daily notice in such paper); (1872) Stephenson v. January. 49 Mo. 465 (trustees' names correctly printed in body of the advertisement, but
a mistake was made in one of them at the bottom);
(1871) Sumrall v. Chaffin, 48 Mo. 402 (number of
lot described correctly, but number of houses on
the lot stated incorrectly); (1870) Kellogg v.
Carrico, 47 Mo. 157 (sufficiency of newspaper);
(1867) Powers v. Kueckhoff, 4 Mo. 425 (notice
stated that sale would be at the court house door
in the town of H., but omitted the name of the
county); (1864) Miller v. Evans, 35 Mo. 45
(misdescription of note); (1855) Beatie v. Butler,
21 Mo. 313 ("town of St. Joseph" held not too
vague for a description of the place of sale); (1851)
Gray v. Shaw, 14 Mo. 341 (advertisement dated

December 7th; sale to be "on the 28th day of
December next."
15. (1891) Wolff v. Ward, 104 Mo. 127,16S.
W. 161 (corrected notice published for nineteen
days instead of twenty); (1883) Siemers v. Sch.
rader, 14 Mo App. 346 (nineteen days' notice).
(1880) Thacker v. Tracy, 8 Mo. App. 315 (Wednesday, February 19, 1874, was named as day of
sale when in fact Thursday, February 19, 1874
was intended); (1846) Stein v. Wilkson, 10 Mo. 75
(one publication twenty days before day of sale
is not twenty days' notice).
16. (1894) Springfield Engine & Thresher Co.
v. Donovan, 120 Mo. 423, 25 S. W. 536 (insufficient period of publication); (1893) Kennedy v.
Siemers, 120 Mo. 73, 25 S. W. 512 (nineteen days'
notice instead of twenty); (1893) Schanewerk v.
Hoberecht, 117 Mo. 22, 22 S. W. 949 (sale not made
at place contemplated in the deed of trust).
17. (1905) Adams v. Carpenter, 187 Mo. 613,
86 S. W. 445 (twenty days' notice given instead of
thirty).
18. (1872) Graham v. King, 50 Mo. 22.
19 (1876) Vail v. Jacobs, 62 Mo. 130; (1876)
Landrum v. Union Bank of Missouri, 63 Mo. 48:
(1910) Markel v. Peck, 144 Mo. App. 701, 129 S.
W. 243,
20. (1900) Axman v. Smith, 156 Mo. 286, 57
S. W. 105.
21. (1908) Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 256, 114 S.
W. 1073; (1893) Holdsworth v. Shannon, 113 Mo.
508. 21 S. W. 85.
22. (1875) Hambright v. Brockman, 59 Mo.
52; (1879) Napton v. Hurt, 70 Mo. 497; (1890)
Davis v. Hess, 103 Mo. 31, 15 S. W. 324; (1891)
Stewart v. Brown, 16 S. W. 389; (1892) Stewart
v. Brown, 112 Mo. 171, 20 S. W 451; (1892)
Maloney v. Webb, 112 Mo. 575, 20 S. W. 683;
(1894) Riggs v. Owen, 120 Mo. 176, 25 S. W. 3561
(1895) Gray v. Worst, 129 Mo. 122, 31 S. W. 585;
(1895) Snyder v. Chicago, S. F. & Co. Ry. Co.,
131 Mo. 568, 33 S. W. 67.

